

lations, in the event of a Republican victory in November, is a substantial guarantee that there will be no back-sliding into isolationism.

This guarantee is backed also by the presence in the Senate of a new generation of Republicans who see the international issue clearly—men who either were not members of the Senate four years ago or who then had, as newcomers, nothing like the authority and prestige which they possess today. Among such men we may mention Ives of New York, Baldwin of Connecticut, Smith of New Jersey, Saltonstall and Lodge of Massachusetts.

If the balance of power in the Senate on questions of foreign policy has thus changed since we were last called upon to choose a candidate for President, so also, we believe, is a marked change evident in Mr. Dewey's own understanding and authority in this field.

The Mr. Dewey of eight years ago, who in 1940 denounced the "interventionists" and expressed his faith that the United States could find security in isolation, was a young man whose career to that point had revolved around an important, but local, prosecuting office. He was, at the time, 38 years old.

The Mr. Dewey of 1944, whom we opposed in favor of Mr. Roosevelt, took a new position strongly on the "interventionist" side. But this Mr. Dewey had played an unimportant part in the shaping of Republican foreign policy during the years from 1940 to 1944; he had deliberately avoided discussion of foreign policy after 1942, on the ground that he was then Governor of New York and not a candidate for national office; and when, in fact, he was nominated for national office in 1944, the campaign which he conducted failed, in our judgment, to demonstrate successfully that the "international" faction of the Republican party had come into control. For these reasons we believed that Mr. Dewey would find, in the event of his election, that his mandate was obscure, his purposes were questioned and his authority was inadequate to the great demands which the crisis of the war would make upon it.

The Mr. Dewey of 1948, whom we now support, has both a firmer grasp of foreign policy and a more active part in making it than the Mr. Dewey of either 1940 or 1944. With Senator Vandenberg, he is one of the two chief living Republican sponsors—Wendell Willkie, supporting Lend-Lease, was the pioneer—of the present bipartisan foreign policy which has placed the immense resources of the United States squarely behind world democracy in its struggle for survival. He has given prompt and effective support to all the major measures which comprise that policy. He has recognized the importance of keeping the United States strong and repeatedly urged the adoption of Selective Service and Universal Military Training. He has counseled his party to keep tariffs low enough to encourage foreign trade and facilitate international payments. He has intervened in a bitter political quarrel in the House of Representatives to urge full support by his party of the Marshall Plan. By every available test he is deeply and irrevocably committed to the thesis that the United States is, and must remain, in the front rank of the world struggle of democracy against totalitarianism. As President, we believe, he could be expected to carry out a bipartisan American foreign policy with firmness and efficiency, and without the confusion of those sudden turns and quick reversals which have characterized the course of the present Administration on such an issue as, say, Palestine.

These are the considerations which encourage us to believe that the bipartisan foreign policy would be in safe hands, in the event of Mr. Dewey's election, and that the provincialism of the House Republican leadership would not prevail against the combined effort of the White House and the Senate.

We have dealt first and at length with the question of foreign policy because of its intrinsic importance in a critical world situation. When we turn from foreign policy to the domestic scene, an already good case for support of the Republican ticket in 1948 is greatly strengthened. The argument here rests both upon the demonstrated infirmities of the present Democratic Administration and upon a reasonable appraisal of the advantages which a change of administrations offers.

The Democratic party is now well along in its sixteenth consecutive year of control of national affairs in Washington. It shows signs of heavy wear and tear. The party has lost the driving power with which it entered office. It has lost the unity which formerly made it an effective instrument of government. Today it cannot even muster a bare majority of its Congressional members behind its own President on domestic issues of critical importance. Mr. Wallace has taken the Left Wing into exile. Mr. Thurmond leads the Right Wing into rebellion. Indecision rules the center.

At one moment the Administration is committed to the thesis that peacetime price control is essentially a "police state" method; at another, price control alone can save the country from inflation. The same President who proposed to draft striking railway workers into the Army as a means of dealing with a labor crisis denounces the incomparably less drastic and better-balanced method of the Taft-Hartley Act as conducive to "slave labor."

There is missing, in the domestic policies of the Administration, the sense of a steady continuity of purpose, of a durable standard of judgment, of a well-considered strategy of action. Good ideas pop at random from the White House—ideas for progressive social legislation and for the full achievement of civil rights—but there is no follow-through and no

realistic hope of a follow-through in the present state of disintegration of the party. In this sixteenth year of Democratic rule there have appeared in Washington the infirmity of will, the intra-party disputes and the frequent examples of slipshod administration which are the traditional results of one party's staying overlong in power.

This is the picture on the domestic side. Mr. Truman has not improved the outlook by turning more and more, as the campaign progressed, to an appeal to class interest as a method of giving fresh meaning to his candidacy.

We do not need to take at face value all the bright promises of the Republican party in order to arrive at the conclusion that in these circumstances, a change of administrations would be beneficial.

That Mr. Dewey is a good executive is an old story now, but it would be a new and refreshing chapter in the present confusion of Washington. This is not to say, of course, that Washington today lacks able and conscientious men in various important posts. Examples of such men come readily to mind, and the country has good reason to be grateful for their service. But the Administration lacks cohesion, as the party itself lacks unity; there are differences of opinion between departments (Agriculture and Commerce, Treasury and Federal Reserve, for example) on important questions of policy, and an atmosphere of fatigue, factionalism and frustration has settled down on Washington.

Mr. Dewey has the capacity of choosing able and energetic men for public office and of creating among them the sense of teamwork which is the essence of good administration. He has demonstrated this to the satisfaction of the voters of New York. He has also demonstrated that he has the ability to combine a forward-looking program of state improvement with a sense of responsibility in state finances.

This is in the record. And there is in the record also evidence that Mr. Dewey's position on social questions has been satisfactory to a majority of the people who vote in this progressive state. Mr. Dewey has strengthened, through competent administration, the social legislation of three liberal Democratic Governors who preceded him in office. He has broken new ground in his use of the state's authority to prevent racial and religious discrimination in employment. He has held a fair balance between the varied economic interests—agricultural, industrial and financial—which are more highly diversified in this state than in most others. Organized labor, of whose special interest so much has been heard in this campaign, has not suffered at the hands of his Administration. On the contrary, organized labor has never before been so strong in New York as it is today, near the end of Mr. Dewey's sixth year at Albany. Nor has it ever before been so well protected by adequate enforcement of state welfare legislation.

Mr. Dewey is now running for the Presidency on a platform that takes for granted the survival and continuation of all the major reforms and innovations of the First Roosevelt Administration. There is no good reason to question the sincerity of this position. Times have changed; the early hysteria has died away, and even the extreme right wing of the Republican party now knows that such Roosevelt measures as Social Security and the Fair Labor Standards Act, the SEC and TVA are here to stay.

The American Presidency has become so great an office that experience alone can test the qualifications of any man to meet its heavy responsibilities with courage and foresight and to use its vast powers wisely. Mr. Dewey, of course, has not had an opportunity to meet this test. But on his record as Governor we believe that the country is entitled to expect of him as President a workmanlike Administration and an improvement in the relations of the President and Congress. We believe that it is also entitled to expect a period of realistic stock-taking, of consolidating in good faith the worth-while gains that innovation has achieved, of planning for the future on the principle that the genius of the American people does not lie in class antagonism but in utilizing the full resources of the nation to create the conditions of a better life.

Thus, on the grounds both of foreign and domestic issues, we find the prospect of a change of administrations hopeful.

One further consideration, by no means unimportant, has led us to our choice. We welcome the fact that the Republican party this year has departed from custom by taking seriously the choice of a candidate for Vice President. The party has, in this instance, forsworn the usual practice of "balancing" the head of the ticket with a second-place candidate as nearly unlike him as possible in political convictions and associations, for the presumed purpose of picking up votes on both sides of the street at once. Instead, the Republican party has nominated, in Governor Warren, a man who is in every way fitted in his own right to assume the burdens of the Presidency if he should be called upon to do so. Mr. Warren has intelligence, he has character, he has courage and he is a liberal.

These are our reasons for choosing the Republican ticket and for recommending its election.

In supporting Mr. Dewey and Mr. Warren we do not intend to lose that independence upon which we have always put chief emphasis or to compromise our own convictions. We shall continue to support, as we have in the past, such of Mr. Truman's views and acts as we find deserving of endorsement. We shall criticize and oppose any of Mr. Dewey's or Mr. Warren's views if they seem to us to lack merit. Above all, we shall do our best to keep our own part in this campaign free

of partisan or personal controversy and focused on the great issues now before the country. At a time when democracy is on trial before the world it is the duty of thoughtful Americans to help conserve that national unity which is our richest heritage.

#### THE CHOICE OF A CANDIDATE

THE NEW YORK TIMES, which supported Mr. Roosevelt against Mr. Dewey in 1944, now supports Mr. Dewey against Mr. Truman.

A full and frank statement of the considerations which have led us to this choice is due our readers.

Those who recall our choice in 1944 will remember that, believing foreign policy to be the great overriding issue of the campaign, we expressed the judgment that Mr. Roosevelt's strong international leadership in foreign policy was more to be relied upon, in the critical situation with which western democracy was then confronted, than were the records of a Republican party whose isolationist wing was still dominant in Congress and of a Republican candidate who had only tardily, and still without marked influence on his party's course, abandoned the isolationist position he had held four years before.

In one respect, we regret to say, the situation which we thus described in 1944 still prevails in 1948. Isolationism still dominates the Republican leadership of the House of Representatives. That leadership still quarrels with the strong international policies which President Truman and Secretary Marshall have had the foresight and the courage to propose, and to which this newspaper has consistently given its support. We found little reason for confidence, in 1944, in the record of House Republicans who had shown themselves to be so blind to the gathering storm in Europe that they were willing to cast immense majorities against Repeal of the Arms Embargo, against Lend-Lease, against Selective Service. We find little reason for confidence, in 1948, in the record of House Republicans who still dodge and duck on the issue of Selective Service, who attempt to run out on the Marshall Plan after authorizing appropriations for it and who resort to gag rule in a clumsy but successful effort to cripple the Hull trade agreements program.

The self-satisfied provincialism typified in the Martin-Taber-Halleck leadership, and the assurance that each of these gentlemen will be back at his post of command in the next Congress in the event of a Republican victory, supply the strongest arguments which have swayed us against supporting the Republican ticket in November. They would succeed in doing so if we did not believe that the control and direction of Republican foreign policy has changed much, and will change more, in other important respects.

The changes consist of the emergence of an enlightened and courageous Republican leadership on foreign policy in the Senate and of the development of reasonable grounds for believing that the active and useful role which Governor Dewey has played since 1944 in the making of Republican foreign policy will enable him as President to achieve results which would have been beyond his reach on the basis of the almost wholly negative role he had played before that date.

The story of Senator Vandenberg epitomizes the first of these two changes. Himself in the isolationist camp before his famous change-of-front speech of Jan. 10, 1945, Mr. Vandenberg has subsequently acquired an understanding of foreign policy, a first-hand experience in the making of foreign policy and a talent for explaining foreign policy to the public which simply did not exist on the Republican side of the Senate in 1944 and which cannot be found on the Democratic side today. His continuation in the key role of Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-