

made when he tried to pack the Court. He is more naturally interested than Mr. Roosevelt in the whole problem of administration, and he could therefore be expected to make a better job of it. He has been a good Executive in Albany; in Washington he would certainly not tolerate the bickering which arises from divided authority and duplication of responsibility. We think he would remove incompetent officials promptly, instead of keeping them at their desks, praising their accomplishments, and creating new agencies to do their work.

These are all important points in the domestic picture. But they argued more strongly in Mr. Dewey's favor before the campaign started, before the Republicans wrote their platform and before Mr. Dewey began his speeches. There are now other factors in the domestic situation.

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The first of these domestic factors is the tariff.

Throughout its whole career, and with special emphasis during the critical interlude between the two Great Wars, this newspaper has fought for the lowering of barriers to international trade. We believe that bold action today is needed here, not only for our own prosperity but in order to create the kind of world in which peace itself will have a chance to prosper.

What does the Republican party propose to do about the tariff?

It proposes to destroy Mr. Hull's multilateral trade-agreement plan, the most constructive experiment in tariff reform undertaken by this country in a generation. It proposes to replace this plan with a series of bilateral agreements. And it proposes to make even this narrow and inadequate program wholly self-defeating by requiring specific Congressional approval of every change that is ever made in any tariff item. The confusion of Republican thought on this issue is further emphasized by the fact that Mr. Dewey himself seemed at first to think that his party had endorsed, instead of scuttled, the Hull trade plan. More recently he has left the tariff issue severely alone.

There is not the slightest reason to believe that Mr. Dewey or his party is prepared or empowered to take constructive action on this important domestic issue, where constructive action is needed both to create new jobs at home and to lay the basis of a sound international economy.

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The Republican party proposes not only to do away with one of the finest achievements of the Roosevelt Administration in the domestic field—the Hull trade agreements. It proposes also to emulate the Roosevelt Administration in some of its worst mistakes. This has become increasingly clear as Mr. Dewey's campaign has developed.

Mr. Roosevelt is running on a platform which calls for Federal expenditures at a high enough level to take care of all the Government's present subsidies and benefits and special favors to special groups, and to add some more besides. This is Mr. Dewey's program too. Among other things, he has promised social security for everybody.

Mr. Roosevelt is running on a platform which calls for full employment plus governmental intervention to keep wages at their wartime levels, even though the effort to keep wages at their wartime levels may defeat this much-desired full employment because the consumer cannot pay the bill. This is Mr. Dewey's program too, announced at San Francisco.

Mr. Roosevelt is running on a platform which promises Federal made-work in sufficient volume to take up all the slack of unemployment in private industry, even though such unemployment results from a price level beyond the reach of the consumer or from other unsound governmental practices. This is a potentially vast promise to which no foreseeable limits can be set. It was also Mr. Dewey's promise at San Francisco.

Mr. Roosevelt is running on a platform which promises to subsidize the farmer from the public treasury, through taxes levied on the city workers who pay the higher prices which the subsidies are intended to establish. This is also Mr. Dewey's plan.

Mr. Roosevelt is running on a platform which will require a tremendous staff of civil servants—these are the famous "bureaucrats"—to perform the manifold public services to which the platform is committed. Mr. Dewey has specified no single existing Federal agency which he would do away with. He has suggested several new Federal agencies which he believes that we should have.

The further the subject is pursued, the more difficult it becomes to see any sharp distinction between the stated position of the Republican party and the Democratic party on domestic issues of this kind.

* * *

Let us turn now to foreign policy. With the war still to be won and the peace still to be made, this issue is to our minds the decisive issue of the election, towering above all domestic problems. For the truth is that no domestic problem, whether it is agriculture and its need of foreign markets, or taxes, or industry, or labor, can be settled without reference to the state of peace and prosperity, or the state of insecurity and depression, in which the rest of the world finds itself.

* * *

On this issue of foreign policy we believe that the scales tip heavily in favor of the Democratic party. We say this for three reasons.

First, there is the record and the present position of the two parties themselves. The Democratic party has not only written a more forthright statement of policy. On this issue it is demonstrably more cohesive, and therefore more capable of prompt and decisive action, than the Republican party.

This is not because of any superior

virtue on the part of Democrats as such. It is rather a matter of party tradition, party geography and, on the part of the professional Republican politicians who constitute the bulk of the party's strength in Congress, the long habit of opposition and the presumed necessity of defending past positions.

But there is nothing theoretical, or unimportant to the future, about the difference between the two sets of professionals in this respect. The matter has been put to the test, time after time, on issues of critical importance. Repeal of the Arms Embargo, which enabled us to arm our natural and inevitable allies; Selective Service, which gave us an adequate army of our own; Lend-Lease, which paved the way for the Grand Alliance of the United Nations and the organization of the peace—these are the chief measures by which the security of the American people has been defended. Every one of these measures was adopted by virtue of Democratic votes in Congress. Every one of them was opposed by large majorities of the Republican members of both the Senate and the House.

In Congress, and outside of Congress, the Republican party has been, and is today, deeply divided on the issue of foreign policy. On this issue, in fact, it is not one party, but two: an isolationist Chicago Tribune Republican party, wishing to read as little as necessary into commitments given grudgingly in this year's platform; and an "internationalist" New York Herald Tribune Republican party, wishing to break as cleanly as possible with the mistakes in the Republican record of the past. Both factions continue to support Mr. Dewey strongly. One or the other will be disappointed.

Speaking for ourselves, it seems safer to trust to the Democratic party, more united and consistent on this issue, the great responsibility of setting up the new international organization which is to defend the world's peace, and of nursing that organization through the first critical challenges and the first bitter disappointments which all too likely it will face.

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Second, there is the background of the two candidates themselves.

With all Mr. Roosevelt's inconsistencies in the field of foreign policy—his shifts on the World Economic Conference, on the Neutrality Act, on the "quarantine" policy of his own invention—the fact remains that in the single greatest crisis of our times, when Britain stood alone as the outpost of civilization against the dark forces that threatened to engulf us, Mr. Roosevelt saw the issue clearly and met the issue boldly. His foreign policy from that point forward acquired a consistency which it had lacked before. The leadership which he then assumed, and to which he has held gallantly, inspired free men in every part of the world to fight with greater hope and courage.

In the acid test of that same crisis Mr. Dewey, already an established national figure and an active candidate for his party's Presidential nomination, denounced the "interventionists" and expressed his faith that the United States could find security in isolation.

He has subsequently changed his position, as he had every right to do, and we have frequently expressed our satisfaction that the change has been wholly in the right direction. But on the issue of foreign policy Mr. Dewey's campaign has been disappointing, particularly in view of the necessity of plain speaking because of his earlier position. Mr. Dewey has failed to drive home the issue hard enough to discourage even the more extreme wing of the Republican isolationists from giving him its warm support. It is still possible for local political leaders and local newspapers in different sections of the country, appealing to constituencies which hold widely different views on the post-war responsibilities which this country should assume, to interpret Mr. Dewey's views in a manner from which the greatest local political profit can be gathered.

Three weeks remain before the campaign ends. During these three weeks Mr. Dewey is to make at least one further speech on foreign policy, and may make more. We hope he will talk plainly and bluntly. But three weeks is too short a time in which to hammer out the strong party unity which the situation needs. The pattern has been set. The strategic time has passed. From the very beginning of this campaign, and long before, we have begged Mr. Dewey to do what Wendell Willkie did as citizen and would have done as nominee—carry the fight on this issue to his own isolationists so boldly that he would demonstrate beyond the shadow of doubt that the "international" faction of the Republican party is completely in control of the destinies of that party.

This Mr. Dewey has failed to do. Because of his failure we believe he would find, in the event of his election, that his mandate was obscure, his purposes were questioned and his authority was inadequate to the great demands which history would make upon it.

* * *

Finally, there is the factor of experience.

We agree entirely with Mr. Dewey that there is no such thing as a free Republic as "an indispensable man." We have never thought there was. It is not by our choice that Mr. Roosevelt is today in a position where his party can call him "indispensable." In 1940 we opposed his re-election and supported Mr. Willkie.

Nevertheless, when we come down to specific cases in the choice actually before us, we cannot dismiss as unimportant the fact that Mr. Roosevelt has a large first-hand knowledge of the problems that will arise in the making of the peace. Moreover, the great prestige and personal following among the plain peoples of the world which he has won with his war leadership might easily prove in itself to be one of the most important cohesive forces binding

together a new world organization in its first experimental years.

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It is on these grounds that we arrive at the conclusion that the margin of preference on the international issue runs strongly in favor of the Democratic party and its candidate. And since we believe that the international issue far overshadows the domestic issue in importance, since we believe that unless the United States does actually win the peace for which its young men are fighting we shall have at best only a fugitive few years before another war engulfs us, we arrive at the conclusion that the Democrats and Mr. Roosevelt are a wiser choice than the Republicans and Mr. Dewey.

Ours has not been an easy choice—a choice between black and white. There will be many who will disagree with us. But this we know: that our decision is the product of hard thinking and good conscience. As such we recommend it to our readers.

THE CHOICE OF A CANDIDATE

THE NEW YORK TIMES, which opposed Mr. Roosevelt in 1940, supports him in 1944.

A full and frank statement of the considerations which have led us to this decision is due our readers.

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We can begin by saying that we have not changed our minds about the domestic record of the Roosevelt Administration. That record falls naturally into two stages: the original New Deal of the first Administration and the re-made New Deal of the later years.

To most of the initial measures of the first New Deal this newspaper gave its admiration and support. These measures were aimed at correcting abuses and extravagances revealed by the depression that began early in Mr. Hoover's Administration; at reviving the hopes of millions of people thrown out of work through no fault of their own; at establishing in this country a larger degree of social justice. Among these measures were the Social Security Act, the National Housing Act, the early measures for relief of unemployment, the laws regulating the activities of the national Stock Exchanges, whose abrupt collapse had ushered in the Great Depression. There is no debate now, though there was then, about the merits of these measures. Both parties now support them.

With the developments of the New Deal during Mr. Roosevelt's second term more troublesome questions arose. A new philosophy stepped in to direct the earlier reforms. This philosophy was based on a new-found conviction that the private enterprise system in this country had deteriorated to a point where its weaknesses could be offset only by more and more centralized governmental control of the national economy, and by more and more governmental spending.

This was the period when the Administration encouraged faith in the omnipotence of the state; when it embarked upon deliberate "deficit-financing"; when it sought ever-increasing powers for the Executive; when it tried to "purge" members of Congress who had dared to disagree even with a small part of its program; when it attempted to pack the Supreme Court itself because that institution had stood in the way of changes it thought necessary. This was the period, also, when the President's weakness in matters of administration began to reveal itself in the quarrels of many of his chief lieutenants; quarrels which have continued to this day.

This newspaper made its position clear in all these matters. It fought the Court-packing plan to the best of its ability. It opposed the "purges." It repeatedly urged upon the President the necessity of reforming his methods of administration. It attacked the whole philosophy of "deficit-financing" by which the country was expected to grow richer by going deeper into debt. It opposed the increasing centralization of authority in Washington at the expense of healthy local government. It opposed the President's third term. It can accept a fourth term only with deep reluctance and strong misgivings, and solely as being justified by the alternatives actually presented to us in a year of war and crisis.

With all the major new policies of the second New Deal we have no sympathy. But when we weigh the balance on domestic issues we must ask: What alternatives do Mr. Dewey and the Republicans offer us?

* * *

In some respects we believe that an Administration led by Mr. Dewey would do a better job in the domestic field than the three Administrations led by Mr. Roosevelt. After twelve years a new broom in Washington is badly needed.

We believe that Mr. Dewey has shown more interest than Mr. Roosevelt in establishing conditions under which business enterprise can prosper. We are confident that he would not make mistakes of the kind that Mr. Roosevelt