

upon the Chicago platform have put it beyond all doubt that the rebels, at this stage of the war, will take no peace except on the basis of Confederate independence. Even the public men of the South who are the least violent, like A. H. STEPHENS and HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON, have said that they would only countenance such a reconstruction as would secure the sovereign rights of the States, including the right of secession at discretion; and this, of course, is nothing but a disunion principle. The rebel leaders and newspaper organs have not concealed their anxiety for the election of McCLELLAN, but yet have practiced no deceit by pretending that McCLELLAN's election would contribute to the restoration of the old Union. Had they chosen to dissimulate, professing a readiness to take up with the Constitution as it is and the Union as it was, they might have supplied the Northern supporters of McCLELLAN with very available electioneering capital. We give them credit for abstaining from all such hypocrisy. They have universally admitted that peace by negotiation involves separation, or at the very least, the establishment of the right to separate—confirming to the letter every averment of the Union party on that point. These Southern developments, during the two months, have thus contributed greatly to give sharpness and exactitude to the issue now to be decided.

The Union party desires nothing more. It is completely ready for the decision of the people. It has no fear of the result. In spite of the diabolical robbery of the votes of the freemen who have gone to fight the rebellion, it has an absolute confidence of an overwhelming majority for the suppression of the rebellion by force, and the salvation of the nation. Like Ajax, it has only asked for light. That secured, it will fell all Northern faction, sedition and treason at a blow.

The End of the Canvass — Its Issues Clearly Made Up.

The Presidential canvass is now substantially closed. Probably every voter who thinks at all, has made up his mind what electoral ballot to cast.

The nine weeks of public discussion concerning the platforms and the candidates, though a much briefer period than is usually devoted to the purpose, have set forth the issues in the clearest light. Perhaps we have never had a Presidential election in which there was less misunderstanding of the questions to be passed upon. The causes of this are obvious enough. No previous election has ever involved issues of such transcendent practical moment; and the knowledge of this naturally stimulated the public mind, from the beginning, to the keenest attention. Then, again, the national conventions of the two parties set forth their respective principles with unusual directness. The Baltimore Convention indeed might not have uttered a word, and yet its bare renomination of President LINCOLN would have sufficed to declare its policy unmistakably. It would be hard to give language a more distinct and explicit shape than that of the Baltimore platform, and yet the policy of the party finds a far clearer exponent yet in its nominee, whose official career has made him a living epistle, known and read of all men.

The Chicago Convention was assembled under auspices which peculiarly favored plainness of deliverance. The party considered it settled that the campaigns of the Summer would prove failures. It therefore did not hesitate to resign the control of the convention to its outspoken peace men. VALLANDIGHAM framed all the important parts of the platform, and in the boldest shape. It was promptly adopted by the convention without an objection from any quarter. VALLANDIGHAM completed his business by moving that, with unanimous consent, GEORGE B. McCLELLAN should be the Presidential nominee of the party: and it was so agreed. The platform and the candidate were accepted by the entire party, in all the States, as meaning nothing else than a recognition that the war was a failure, and a formal inauguration of a peace policy. Up to the fall of Atlanta, not a speaker or newspaper of the party pretended anything else. That heavy blow to the rebellion, followed as it was by an outburst of loyal enthusiasm throughout the North, soon brought home to the more calculating managers of the party the necessity of more reserve and equivocation; and McCLELLAN, although the platform had been submitted to him before adoption, and had received his full approval, was made to give his letter of acceptance an ambiguous cast, adapted to confuse the square issue made by the platform. The attempt was not successful. Notwithstanding all the glittering generalities for the Union, his new identification with the Peace party was still apparent, both in what he did say and in what he did not say. In what he did say, for his words were, that "to restore the Union, the spirit of *conciliation* and *compromise* must prevail in our councils and in the hearts of the people," when, by a moral necessity, that spirit is incompatible with any effectual war policy. In what he did not say, for there was not a syllable in the letter bearing directly or indirectly against "a cessation of hostilities," in the way of an armistice; and there is no peace man who would not be satisfied with an armistice, for all know that the war, once suspended, would never be resumed. Moreover, the whole conduct of the party since—its constant complaints of the heavy taxes of the war, when it is certain that no war of this magnitude can be conducted without heavy taxes; its regular habit of belittling the successes of our armies and magnifying their reverses; its uniform abstinence from all severity of language against the rebels; its ill-concealed satisfaction on hearing anything auguring ill for the speedy suppression of the rebellion—these and a thousand other manifestations have made the anti-war spirit of the party perfectly patent to everybody, so that, in spite of all the equivocations of speech during the canvass, the essential policy of the opposition stands out even more boldly before the public eye now than when first exhibited in the Chicago platform.

Loyal men can congratulate themselves not only upon this clearness of issue between war and peace, but upon the development of the fact that this issue is indeed no other than Union or Disunion. The comments of the public men and public presses of the South